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DURING the past fifteen years, econ-| omists have constructed an im-pressive theoretical apparatus 
for viewing the effect on a group of eco-
nomically advanced nations of forming a 
customs union (CU). But there is no 
comparable body of analysis dealing 
jwith customs unions among less devel-
oped countries. To an important degree, 
such a theory must focus on economies of 
scale, changes in the terms of trade, bal-
ance of payments problems, externali-
ties, capital imports, and underemploy-
ment—factors that have received isolat-
ed treatment in the literature but that 
have not been successfully woven into an 
integrated analytical framework. How-
ever, before one can construct a general 
model that takes these "dynamic" fac-
tors into account, it is useful to lay a 
foundation whose blocks are the ordinary 
static efficiency considerations dealt with 
in the CU literature relating to developed 
countries. 
A fundamental difficulty in building 
on existing theory as developed by Viner, 
Meade, Lipsey, and others,2 relates to 
what may be regarded as a dilemma of 
CU theory. Except for the terms-of-
trade argument,3 the very grounds on 
which a CU is said to be superior to non-
discriminatory protection are precisely 
those grounds on which the union is 
necessarily inferior to free trade. A 
good" CU is one that raises income 
1 The authors are indebted to Richard NT'Cooper 
and Harry G. Johnson for theiir veitsNMlbHUTdbm- i 
ments. 
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through trade creation—that is, a move 
toward free trade. A "bad" union, on the 
other hand, reduces income through 
trade diversion—that is, a more protec-
tionist policy. But, if a country accepts 
a "good" union as desirable, why does it 
not move all the way to free trade? And 
conversely, if a country is willing to re-
ject the full benefits of free trade for the 
sake of unilateral protection, why should 
it be willing to give up its sheltered in-
dustries for the partial benefits of a CU ? 
These questions are not dealt with sys-
tematically in the literature.4 
2 See Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1950); James E. Meade, The Theory of Customs 
Unions (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 
1955); Richard G. Lipsey, "Trade Diversion and 
Welfare," Economica, X X I V (February, 1957), 40-
46, and "The Theory of Customs Unions: A General 
Survey," Economic Journal, L X X (September, 
1960), 496-513; John Spraos, "The Condition 
for a Trade-Creating Customs Union," Eco-
nomic Journal (March, 1964), pp. 101-8; Bela 
Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Home-
wood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961). 
3 We have ruled out terms-of-trade effects in this 
paper for three reasons: (1) They are probably not 
an important source of gain from economic integra-
tion among a group of less developed countries. (2) 
In those cases where a terms-of-trade effect is im-
portant (for example, the European Economic Com-
munity), it is not especially interesting to evaluate a 
CU without considering also the effects of retaliation 
by those excluded from the club. (3) Our concern here 
is with the pure (static) theory of CU's among less 
developed countries; it is convenient to simplify the 
analysis as far as possible. 
4 We have discussed this issue elsewhere; see our 
"A New Look at Customs Union Theory" (Santa 
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, P-2972-2, 
April, 1965). 
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This issue is especially relevant to the 
analysis of a CU formed by less developed 
countries. Whereas existing CU theory 
is, essentially, a disguised argument for 
free trade, what is needed is an analysis 
of alternative policies of protection. The 
mere fact that preunion protection exists 
suggests that free trade is not viewed as 
desirable by many countries, notably by 
a majority of the less developed coun-
tries. Although present CU theory leads 
to the conclusion that a world-wide union 
would be optimal, few of these countries 
would accept this view. Indeed, a princi-
pal objective of economic integration 
among less developed countries is to fos-
ter industrial development and to guide 
such development along more economic 
lines. Yet, the considerations that lead 
such a country to favor economic inte-
gration and to prefer one country to an-
other as a prospective union partner lie 
outside traditional analysis. For ex-
ample, what insight does CU theory pro-
vide regarding whether Mexico would be 
anxious to form a CU with the United 
States? Would trade creation provide 
Mexico with a welfare gain? Or would the 
blow to Mexican industry more than off-
set any rise in non-industrial income? 
Just as increases in protection may 
have their cost, so may decreases in pro-
tection. Protection is justified, or ration-
alized, on many grounds, political as well 
as economic. It can be used to alter a 
country's terms of trade, to increase do-
mestic employment, to raise revenue, or 
to foster local industry. It is certainly 
true that many less developed countries 
have accepted the arguments put for-
ward by Prebisch, Seers, and others, in 
support of an accelerated industrializa-
tion policy.6 Much of the work of the 
United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Economic 
Commission for Africa, for example, is 
concerned with outlining such a policy 
The present study attempts to lay a 
cornerstone for a more general theory 0f 
CU's in less developed countries. We do 
not attempt to examine the conditions 
under which a protectionist policy makes 
good sense; rather, we accept industriali-
zation as a legitimate policy goal and 
consider how membership in a CU may 
enable a less developed country to 
achieve more economically the ends 
served by protection. We emphasize, 
again, that we do not attempt here the 
complete dynamic theory that must 
ultimately form the basis for decision-
making.6 Our objective is the more mod-
est one of weaving together into a single 
analytical strand the fragments relating 
to the static impact of a CU. 
P R E F E R E N C E F O R I N D U S T R Y 
Our analysis is based on the simple 
assumption that there may be a social 
preference for particular types of eco-
nomic activity—which we shall call 
"industry"—compared with other forms 
of activity. Specifically, we assume that 
economic planners in a less developed 
country may be willing to accept some 
reduction in national income to achieve 
an increase in industrial production.7 In-
5 See Raul Prebisch, "Commercial Policy in the 
Underdeveloped Countries," American Economic 
Review, X L I X (May, 1959), 251-73; Dudley Seers, 
" A Model of Comparative Rates of Growth in 
the World Economy," Economic Journal, L X X I I I 
(March, 1962), 45-78. 
6 Some elements of a dynamic theory of less 
developed countries are contained in Sidney Dell, 
Trade Blocs and Common Markets (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); R. S. Bhambri, "Customs 
Unions and Underdeveloped Countries," Economia 
Internationale, X V (March, 1962), 235-58; Massell, 
"The Distribution of Gains in a Common Market" 
(in preparation). 
7 Throughout this analysis we shall identify social 
choice with the choice of the national economic 
planners. It is important to note that their concern 
is with the choice between industrial and other types 
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dustrial production must, therefore, be 
introduced as a new dimension of the 
analysis. To compare alternative produc-
tion possibilities, not only the national 
income but also the level of industrial 
production associated with each must be 
taken into account. This is shown in 
Figure 1 by the planners' "demand" 
curve, DD', which expresses the "price" 
(in terms of national income foregone) 
ferent to a choice between any two dif-
ferent industries and that diversification 
within the industrial sector is not an 
objective.8 Therefore, the planners satis-
fy their demand for industrial production 
by selecting the lowest cost industries. 
The "supply" side in Figure 1 is repre-
sented by the stepped curve SS'. T o 
simplify the exposition, we assume full 
employment, constant costs, competitive 
D 
FIG. 1.—Demand for industry 
that planners are willing to pay for each 
increment to industrial production. It is 
assumed that, at a higher price, planners 
will typically choose less protection. It is 
further assumed that planners are indif-
of economic activity (or, equivalently, between indus-
trial activity and national income). They are indif-
ferent with respect to how consumers spend their 
income. Note also that we do not assume that plan-
ners do prefer industry, only that they may. The 
limiting case, where planners have no preference for 
industry, is discussed briefly in the text below. 
pricing, and constant terms of trade.9 
Consider that initially only a single agri-
cultural export good (corn) is produced 
and that corn production is more profit-
able in this country than any other eco-
nomic activity. It is cheaper to import 
8 The model can be generalized easily to take 
these factors into account, but the exposition be-
comes cumbersome. 
9 These assumptions are in the spirit of existing 
CU theory. 
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all other goods in exchange for corn ex-
ports than to produce them locally. The 
average "cost" of a local industry is then 
defined as the amount by which the aver-
age cost of producing the industry's out-
put exceeds the price of a comparable 
imported good.10 This cost is a measure 
of national income foregone by producing 
each unit of the good, where income is 
measured in purchasing power at world-
market prices. It is assumed that indus-
tries under consideration by the planners 
are separable—that production in one 
does not require the presence of another, 
either as a market or as a source of 
supply. 
To obtain the supply-of-industry 
(hereinafter referred to as "supply") 
curve, industries are ranked in ascending 
order according to their cost. As all in-
dustry is by assumption uneconomic and 
only corn is exported,11 domestic demand 
places a constraint on the level of produc-
tion in each industry. As a result, an ex-
pansion in industrial output involves 
moving up the steps in the curve, each 
step corresponding to a successively 
higher-cost industry.12 
The optimal level of industrial produc-
tion, as determined by the intersection 
of the demand and supply curves, is 0 V 
in Figure 1. Corresponding to this level 
of industrial production is an efficient 
tariff,13 that is, a set of tariff rates that 
provide enough protection in each indus-
try to the left of V to induce local pro-
duction in that industry and that pro-
vide no protection for industries to the 
10 By assumption, all industries have a cost great-
er than zero. 
11 We shall discuss export subsidies later in the 
text; for now, they are ruled out. 
12 In Fig. 1 the steps have been drawn the same 
= length. This need not be the case but was done for 
ease of exposition—see text below. Note that the 
f diagram ignores any changes in quantities consumed 
that may result from the adverse income effects to 
^ consumers of increased protection. 
right of V. With constant costs, indus-
tries either supply the entire domestic 
market or do not operate at all. An in-
dustry will operate if (and only if) pro-
tected by a tariff rate no lower than the 
industry's cost.14 In Figure 1, VP is the 
marginal cost of protection to the econo-
my, that is, the cost of protecting the 
marginal industry. The total cost of pro-
tection is the area OSPV. 
The welfare implications of this analy-
sis can be seen more clearly in Figure 2. 
The technological trade-off between na-
tional income and industrial production 
is described by MN, which can be de-
rived from the supply curve SS' in Figure 
1. Curve MN shows how much national 
income must be foregone to achieve al-
ternative levels of industrial production, 
subject to the constraint that all indus-
trial production is consumed domestical-
ly. We shall term this curve a produc-
tion-consumption locus.16 Moving down 
curve MN corresponds to moving up the 
hierarchy of industries and increases the 
marginal cost of protection in discrete 
steps. Thus MN is stepwise convex. At 
point N, the economy would be produc-
ing only industrial goods, all for domestic 
consumption. National income would 
then equal industrial production. Under 
the present assumptions, then, MN can-
not cross the 45° ray from the origin. 
13 Throughout the paper, we use the term "tariff" 
as shorthand for a set of tariff rates, one for each 
industry (some of which may be zero). Note also 
that we are focusing on potential gains; whether 
these gains are realized depends, of course, on wheth-
er an appropriate tariff is actually chosen. 
14 With constant costs, a protective tariff on a 
particular industry's product is either ineffective or 
prohibitive. Provided the tariff is prohibitive, be-
cause of assumed competitive pricing it makes no 
difference how high the tariff rate is raised. 
16 The production-consumption locus is not to be 
confused with either a production-possibilities or a 
consumption-possibilities locus; in a sense, it is a 
blend of the two. 
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The indifference curve II' in Figure 2 
expresses the planners' preference for in-
dustrial production and is related to the 
demand curve DD' in Figure l.16 If 
planners were indifferent between pro-
ducing corn and industrial goods, the 
indifference curve would be horizontal, 
S P E C I A L I Z A T I O N A N D E F F I C I E N C Y 
Now consider two countries, North 
and South, each with a development 
plan that consists simply of a list of in-
dustries to be developed during the plan 
period. Assume, for expository conven-
ience, that the domestic demand is the 
O V 
Industrial production 
FIG. 2.—Preference for industry 
providing a corner optimum at point M , 
with all of the economy's resources de-
voted to corn production. With a nega-
tively sloped indifference curve, as shown 
in Figure 2, the optimal position is at 
point P and includes a mixture of OV 
industrial goods and corn output equal 
to OE - OV. 
16 If the planners' demand for industry is income 
elastic, the demand curve in Fig. 1 will shift to the 
right if MN shifts up. Strictly speaking, therefore, 
we should begin with the analysis contained in Fig. 2 
and then derive the Fig. 1 results. But for clarity of 
exposition, it appears better to proceed as we have. 
same for each industrial product and is 
equal in the two countries.17 
Next, consider the formation of a CU 
between North and South. As contrasted 
with a common market, a CU does not 
permit a free flow of resources between 
member countries. But, while resources 
are not pooled, markets are; and the 
pooling of markets permits specializa-
tion. Unless the two countries have iden-
17 Then the steps in Fig. 1 are all of the same 
length. Moreover, the steps in one country's supply 
curve are the same length as those in the other 
country's curve. 
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tical economic structures, they will be 
able to produce a given level of combined 
industrial output at a lower cost in terms 
of income foregone. 
The level of industrial production, its 
composition, and its distribution be-
tween the two countries is fully deter-
mined by a common external tariff18— 
that is, a set of tariff rates, one for each 
item. In principle, any tariff can be 
chosen. Thus the level, composition, and 
(within limits)19 distribution of industrial 
production is subject to manipulation by 
the economic planners. For this reason it 
is of little interest to ask whether a CU 
is "good" or "bad" without specifying 
the tariff to be chosen. The question to 
which the present paper is principally 
addressed can now be formulated: Is 
there any tariff that will make both 
countries better off relative to individu-
ally optimal policies of non-preferential 
protection?20 
One class of tariffs that deserves con-
sideration is the set of "efficient" tariffs, 
where an efficient tariff is defined as one 
that provides any specified level of in-
dustrial production in the CU—irrespec-
tive of the composition and distribution 
of this production—at the lowest cost 
in terms of combined national income 
foregone by the two countries. 
The gains from specialization, under 
assumed tariff efficiency, can be seen in 
Figure 3a. The curves Sn and S3 repre-
sent the supply curves for North and 
South, respectively, before forming the 
CU. With the CU, there is a new hierar-
chy of industries for the CU as a whole; 
18 To avoid cumbersome phases, we shall refer to 
the common external tariff in a CU as simply the 
"tariff." 
19 The "limits" will become clear presently. 
20 A limiting case of which is free trade. There 
may be more than one such tariff, in which case we 
, are also faced with the problem of choosing from 
' among a set of tariffs. See text below. 
corresponding to this hierarchy is a new 
supply curve, Su. The new supply curve 
will lie below the old curves for two rea-
sons.21 First, if any item is produced at 
all in the CU, it will be produced in the 
lower-cost country;22 second, the lowest 
cost industries can be operated at twice 
the pre-CU level of output (to supply 
both markets), so that any given level of 
industrial production can be obtained 
without resort to the higher-cost indus-
tries. There is an efficient tariff corre-
sponding to each point on the combined 
supply curve. Industries to the left of 
that point are protected; industries to 
the right are not. 
The tariff that is chosen will depend 
on the preferences of the planners in the 
two countries. If the planners are indif-
ferent as to the distribution of industrial 
production between the countries, they 
will choose an efficient tariff.23 The initial 
lists contained industries that the plan-
ners were willing to pay for. In the CU, 
planners can obtain satisfaction more 
efficiently by pooling markets. There is, 
consequently, an income effect; the coun-
tries can produce the same combined in-
dustrial output with the CU that was 
planned initially and will have resources 
to spare. The income effect will tend to 
lead to an increase in both industrial pro-
duction and national income. There is 
also a substitution effect, due to the 
lower marginal cost of protection, which 
will lead to an increase in industrial pro-
21 Assuming Sn and S, not to be horizontal. 
22 That is, the country with the intra-union com-
parative advantage. 
23 We have already assumed planners to be in-
different with respect to the composition of the 
industrial sector. Indifference with respect to the 
distribution between countries can be visualized 
most easily in terms of the formation of a joint 
economic planning board with responsibility for the 
economic development of the CU as a whole (al-
though, in practice, even such a board is always 
subject to pressures from each of the countries). 
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juction at the cost of national income, 
jjoth effects will combine to increase in-
dustrial production; national income will 
increase as well, if the income effect out-
weighs the substitution effect. 
As an example of the gains, consider 
that, in Figure 3a, each country initially 
planned industrial production equal to 
OM, so that planned industrial produc-
tion of the two countries combined was 
equal to OP. North planned to produce 
shoes and hats, and South planned to 
produce coats and shirts. With a CU, the 
same combined industrial production, 
OP, can be obtained at a lower cost by 
producing twice as many shoes and coats 
and by foregoing production of higher-
cost hats and shirts. 
It may be more realistic to drop the 
assumption that planners are indifferent 
to the distribution of gains between 
countries, and to assume instead that 
planners in each country are primarily or 
solely interested in gains to that country.24 
24 As countries are decision-making units, it is 
important that each member country is convinced 
that it gains from joining the CU; otherwise it can 
refuse to join. 
Suits 
Dresses 
Coats 
Ties 
Sweaters 
Coats 
L M N 
Industrial production 
L M N 
Industrial production 
(a) 
( b ) 
Hats 
Shoes 
Dresses 
Ties 
Sweaters 
Dresses 
Shoes 
Hats 
o L M N 
Industrial production 
( C ) 
FIG. 3.—Effects of specialization 
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Each country's level of social welfare (as 
reflected by the planners' indifference-
curve map) is determined by that coun-
try's level of industrial production and 
income and is, therefore, completely spec-
ified by a common external tariff, to-
gether with a rule for distributing income 
between the countries. 
If the tariff and the rule for distribut-
ing income are chosen by the two plan-
ning boards in collaboration, and if the 
two groups of planners act rationally,25 
they will choose a tariff and a rule that 
jointly result in a Pareto-optimal situa-
tion, that is, that result in a pair of levels 
of industrial production and national in-
come such that neither country's social 
welfare can be increased without decreas-
ing the social welfare of the partner coun-
try. But, as the following example illus-
trates, an efficient tariff may be non-
Pareto optimal for any distributive rule. 
Figure 3b is similar to Figure 3a, ex-
cept that North's hat industry is now 
cheaper than South's coat industry. If, 
as before, combined industrial produc-
tion is to be equal to OP, then an efficient 
tariff will protect shoes and hats, both of 
which will locate in North. North gets 
twice as much industry with the CU than 
without, but South gets no industry at 
all. 
Now, make the further illustrative as-
sumption that the planners' demand 
curve in each country is a vertical line 
passing through point M . Then South 
will willingly give up an arbitrarily large 
amount of income to obtain industrial 
production equal to OM. For South to 
reach this position with an efficient 
tariff requires North to produce both 
shoes and hats, with North's total indus-
trial production then amounting to OP. 
North's hat industry causes both coun-
tries an income loss and, given North's 
36 As we assume throughout the analysis. 
planners' demand curve, there is no com-
mensurate gain. Then, whatever the dis-
tribution of income between the two 
countries, this efficient tariff is non-
Pareto optimal. The welfare of both 
countries could be raised by eliminating 
North's hat production. There is no effi-
cient tariff that will enable each country 
to produce exactly OM units of industrial 
output.26 
By considering only efficient tariffs one 
throws away degrees of freedom. The 
level of the tariff can be changed, and in-
come can be redistributed between the 
countries; but industrial production can-
not be redistributed. Additional degrees 
of freedom can be gained by considering 
a wider class of tariffs. And, as we shall 
see below, still more freedom can be ob-
tained by considering either a partial CU 
or subsidization. 
Q U A S I - P A R E T O O P T I M A L I T Y 
Given a national preference for indus-
try, the evaluation of the impact of a CU 
on a member country must take into 
account not only changes in the coun-
try's national income but also changes in 
the size of the country's industrial sector. 
A gain in either dimension, if offset by a 
sufficiently large loss in the other dimen-
sion, will render the economy worse off. 
It is not sufficient to look at the joint 
income of the participants; to assess the 
welfare effects of a CU requires examin-
ing the two indifference-curve maps. 
Sepcifying a common external tariff 
determines the level of industrial produc-
tion in each country and the joint na-
tional income. But, because there is scope 
26 In this situation the only efficient tariff that 
results in Pareto optimality is a tariff protecting 
shoes only. But then the gains all go to North. Com-
pensation (in the form of income) paid by North to 
South would have no effect. Admittedly, this ex-
ample is extreme, but it illustrates a more general 
point about tariff efficiency, as defined here. 
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for redistributing this income without 
changing the tariff, the income of each 
country is not specified. Now, let us de-
fine a quasi-Pareto-optimal tariff as a 
tariff with the following property: Given 
the level of industrial production in each 
country, joint national income is maxi-
mized. 
An efficient tariff is necessarily quasi-
Pareto optimal, but not all quasi-Pareto-
optimal tariffs are efficient. An example 
of an inefficient quasi-Pareto-optimal 
tariff can be seen in Figure 3b; as noted 
above, an efficient tariff corresponding to 
joint industrial production of OP is one 
that protects shoes and hats. This is also 
(quasi-Pareto optimal. However, a tariff 
that protects only shoes and coats is not 
efficient but is quasi-Pareto optimal—-
there is no other tariff, providing each 
country with industrial production equal 
to OM, that will yield a higher joint in-
come. Even though coat production is 
more expensive than hat production, 
coat production is South's most economic 
(least uneconomic) industry. A quasi-
Pareto-optimal tariff is designed to per-
mit each country to produce any specified 
level of industrial production in the 
cheapest way. It follows that genuine 
Pareto optimality must require choosing 
a quasi-Pareto-optimal tariff.27 
It follows from the "rules" underlying 
CU's that neither country is permitted 
to produce a good that can be produced 
more cheaply in the other country. This 
may create problems, as can be seen in 
Figure 3c. Here South has an intra-union 
comparative rfwadvantage in its three 
cheapest industries—hats, shoes, and 
dresses—and hence cannot produce them 
in a CU with North. If these industries 
27 There will be a quasi-Pareto-optimal tariff cor-
responding to each pair of levels of industrial produc-
tion. 
are protected at all, they will locate in 
lower-cost North. However, of those 
goods that South can produce, quasi-
Pareto optimality requires that the 
cheapest are selected for protection. 
Thus the lowest cost industry in which 
South has an intra-union comparative 
advantage—ties—would be the first in- ' 
dustry on South's list. 
It follows from the discussion above 
that, under quasi-Pareto optimality, 
membership in a CU will result in a new 
hierarchy of industries for each country 
and, consequently, in new supply curves. 
The new hierarchy will include only in-
dustries in which the country has an 
intra-union comparative advantage. The 
ranking of these industries will remain 
unchanged, but each industry, if estab-
lished at all, will operate at twice the 
planned pre-CU level of production, to 
supply the whole CU market. 
If the distribution of income is left to 
market forces, the "cost" of each pro-
tected industry is shared equally by the 
two countries. Consequently, from each 
country's point of view, the cost of estab-
lishing an industry is reduced by one-
half. This raises an interesting point. Be-
cause half the cost of a country's uneco-
nomic industry is paid by consumers in 
the partner country, there is a divergence 
between private (which in this case 
means "national") and social (meaning 
" C U " ) costs of industry. In other words, 
there are external diseconomies associat-
ed with industrialization. If each country 
ignores these diseconomies and deter-
mines its level of industrial production ' 
with regard to private cost considera-
tions alone, then a quasi-Pareto-optimal 
tariff will produce results that are non-
Pareto optimal. We shall develop this 
point in the following section. 
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Industrial production 
FIG. 4.-—Impact of a customs union on the production-consumption locus 
P R O D U C T I O N - C O N S U M P T I O N L O C U S 
I N A C U S T O M S U N I O N 
Corresponding to each country's new 
supply-of-industry curve is a new pro-
duction-consumption locus. If South in-
creases its level of industrial production, 
it moves out along its locus. But if indus-
trial production increases in North, 
South's locus is shifted toward the origin. 
I 
South to buy no products from North, 
South retains the pre-CU option of pro-
ducing at point M. Beyond point M, the 
new locus may lie wholly above the old 
one (as drawn in Figure 4); alternatively, 
the new locus may lie wholly below or 
may intersect the old locus.29 
If North produces industrial goods, 
then South can no longer attain point M. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. South's 
preunion locus is MN. The new locus is 
ML, assuming there to be no industrial 
production in North.28 This new locus 
originates at point M because, assuming 
28 With a CU, the production-consumption locus 
is no longer constrained not to cross the 45° ray from 
the origin. South's value of industrial production 
may exceed its income, if some of the industrial 
goods are sold in North. Similarly, if South buys 
uneconomic industrial goods from North, South may 
be unable to reach the 45° ray. Whether the locus 
falls short of or crosses the 45° ray depends on how 
the CU affects South's terms of trade. 
South's locus then shifts down by an 
amount equal to South's share of the dif-
ference between North's cost of produc-
29 The fact that South's industrial production is 
partly supported by North's consumers tends to 
make South's new locus lie outside the old one (as a 
given industry costs South only one-half the pre-
union price). In addition, specialization on the 
lowest cost industries (if South has an intra-union 
comparative advantage in these industries) will tend 
to make South's new locus lie above the old one. The 
new locus may lie below the old one only if South 
has an intra-union comparative disadvantage in its 
cheapest industries and must turn to higher-cost 
industries in order to have an industrial sector at all. 
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tj0n and world-market prices of all goods 
produced by North (shown in Figure 4 
by the distance MR).30 Thus the position 
0f South's locus will depend on North's 
level of industrial production and on how 
uneconomic this production is.31 
P A R E T O O P T I M A L I T Y 
Let us define a Pareto-optimal tariff 
as a set of common external tariff rates 
with the following property: Given some 
rule for redistributing income, the tariff 
results in levels of industrial production 
in each country such that neither coun-
try's welfare can be raised without a re-
duction in the other country's welfare. 
If the distribution of income is left to 
market forces, then each country will 
equate the marginal gain from industrial 
production to the marginal -private cost, 
and a Pareto-optimal tariff will not be 
chosen. This can be seen as follows: An 
increase in industrial production in South 
will, up to a point, move South to a 
higher social indifference curve, as can be 
seen in Figure 4. But, for the reasons out-
lined above, an increase in North's indus-
trial output will force South onto a lower 
production-consumption locus and, con-
sequently, a lower indifference curve. By 
selecting a tariff that puts each country 
at the point at which an indifference 
curve is tangent to the production-con-
sumption locus, both countries will be 
ignoring external diseconomies of indus-
trialization. Although a unilateral reduc-
tion in industrial production will make 
either country worse off, a negotiated 
joint reduction in industrial production 
50 In other words, because South buys North's 
uneconomic goods at a price above the world market 
Pnce, South's terms of trade deteriorate. 
31 If North has an intra-union comparative ad-
vantage in all industries (and South consequently a 
comparative advantage only in corn production), 
' e n South's new locus will consist simply of one 
Point on the vertical axis. 
will make both countries better off.32 
Thus, the result is not Pareto optimal. 
A genuine Pareto-optimal solution re-
quires each country to take account of 
external diseconomies generated by its 
industrial production. One way to do 
this is to require each country to pay full 
income compensation to its partner for 
the relatively high-cost industrial goods 
sold in the partner's market. We can then 
construct a new curve—call it an "ad-
justed production-consumption locus." 
Each point on South's adjusted locus 
shows the income and industrial produc-
tion available to South, after deducting 
from South's income an amount equal to 
the increased cost imposed on North. 
South pays no compensation if it has no 
industrial production, so the adjusted 
locus, ML, originates at point M (Figure 
5) as did the old locus, MN. But as 
South's industrial output expands, the 
required compensation increases, so that 
the divergence between the adjusted 
locus and the unadjusted locus widens. 
South can select any point on its ad-
justed locus without affecting North's 
welfare. In Figure 5, South would choose 
point P, which represents a tangency 
solution. South can do no better, and 
North is indifferent between this point 
and any other point on the same locus. 
There is a comparable point on North's 
adjusted locus. The two countries can be 
maintained at this pair of points by a 
Pareto-optimal tariff.33 
Although the present construct leads 
to a unique Pareto-optimal solution, 
other Pareto-optimal situations exist. 
To demonstrate this, modify the rules 
32 This is a common characteristic of two-person-
non-zero sum games; an interesting parallel is the 
issue of disarmament. 
33 We wish to emphasize that this tariff is not 
necessarily Pareto optimal (as defined above) with 
any other set of rules for distributing income be-
tween the countries. 
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as follows: Each year, North makes 
some specified lump-sum income pay-
ment to South. Then South's locus shifts 
up, and North's locus shifts down. Unless 
the planners' demand for industry is 
wholly income inelastic, each country 
will choose a new level of industrial pro-
duction, and there will be a new Pareto-
optimal tariff.34 
Each country's adjusted production-
consumption locus will lie outside its pre-
CU locus if the country has an intra-
union comparative advantage in its 
lowest cost industries (so that the cost of 
a given level of industrial production is 
reduced). On the other hand, the adjust-
ed locus will lie inside the pre-CU locus if 
the country has a comparative disadvan-
tage in its cheapest industries (so that it 
is forced to move up the hierarchy of 
industries). Another possibility is that a 
country's adjusted locus cuts the pre-
union locus. Then some levels of protec-
tion will be cheaper but other levels more 
costly, compared with the pre-CU situa-
tion. 
If, at the relevant35 part of the curve, 
each country's adjusted production-
consumption locus lies outside its pre-
union locus, then a CU necessarily per-
mits both countries to gain.36 Each coun-
try can produce at its preunion level of 
industrial output and will have resources 
to spare. But if the relevant part of either 
country's adjusted locus lies inside the 
pre-CU locus, that country is made 
worse off by the CU—at least under the 
tariff and set of rules discussed in this 
section.37 In this case it may be possible 
34 A Pareto-optimal tariff is necessarily quasi-
Pareto optimal, but the converse does not hold. Also, 
a Pareto-optimal tariff need not be efficient, nor 
need an efficient tariff result in Pareto optimality. 
36 This is admittedly a question-begging word. 
30 That is, if the distributive rules and the tariff 
are chosen as outlined here. 
for the more favored country to offer 
sufficient additional compensation to the 
less favored country in order to leave 
both countries better off. If this fails, 
then departure from the principle of free 
trade within the CU may still permit 
gains to both countries. We shall take up 
these possibilities in the two following 
sections. 
C O M P E N S A T I O N 
In Figure 6, South's adjusted produc-
tion-consumption locus is ML, compared 
with a pre-CU locus of MN. South is 
therefore forced onto a lower indifference 
curve in the CU. The amount of addi-
tional income compensation necessary to 
make South at least as well off with as 
without the union is shown in Figure 6 
as EF. If North gains more than this 
amount, North will be able to compen-
sate South fully and still be better off.38 
In this case, a CU is potentially benefi-
cial. It is possible, however, that North 
will not gain enough to pay sufficient 
compensation to South, even if North's 
income gains exceed South's income 
losses.39 
P A R T I A L C U S T O M S U N I O N S 
Allowing protection within a CU may 
increase the gains obtainable from one. 
A partial CU can be defined as an ar-
37 One might think that a readjustment of ex-
change rates would enable both countries to special-
ize. But remember that each country produces corn 
for export; exchange rates are determined by the 
average cost of producing corn. 
38 This transfer of income will shift South's locus 
out and North's locus in, so that a new tariff will be 
chosen. 
3S If South loses industry as well as (or instead of) 
income, the amount of income compensation South 
requires depends on the shape of South's indifference 
curves, which bears no relation to the amount of 
North's income gains. For many developing nations, 
the indifference curves may be sufficiently steep in 
the relevant range that income compensation alone 
will not work. 
Industrial production 
FIG. 5.—The adjusted production-consumption locus 
FIG. 6.—Compensation 
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rangement whereby two or more coun-
tries have a common external tariff—but 
not internal free trade. For example, 
some of South's manufactured goods 
could be protected against North's indus-
try. South would have unrestricted ac-
cess to North's market, but the reverse 
would not hold. 
To take a simple but extreme case, 
suppose South is allowed to establish all 
the industries on its list, even though 
these industries are more economic in 
North. Assume also that North produces 
other industrial goods and sells them in 
the combined CU market, compensating 
South for the higher cost of these goods, 
compared to world-market prices. South 
is no worse off (indeed, South has not 
been affected by the union); and North 
gains, since the total cost of producing a 
given amount of industry in North is 
less than before the CU was formed. 
It might even be desirable to allow 
South to export some of its higher-cost 
industrial goods to North. Suppose for 
example that, although South's most ef-
ficient industry can produce more cheap-
ly in North, it nevertheless ranks far 
down on North's list, so that North 
chooses not to establish this industry. 
Then South can establish the industry, 
supply the combined market, and com-
!'! pensate North. In this case, North is 
clearly no worse off and South gains by 
being able to specialize on a low-cost 
industry instead of having to also devel-
op a higher cost industry to serve the local 
market. These arrangements insure that 
each country's adjusted production-con-
sumption locus lies outside the pre-CU 
locus. 
S U B S I D I E S 
In the analysis above, we have ruled 
out export subsidies. In principle, sub-
sidizing exports offers greater scope f o r 
expanding the industrial sector than 
does a CU. If subsidization opened up 
world markets to a less developed coun-
try, the cost of protection would be lower 
still than in a CU. Subsidizing exports 
would permit more effective specializa-
tion. But "real-world" complications are 
such that an industrial sector based on 
production for export may be exceeding-
ly difficult to establish and maintain. 
Not only are the industrial markets of 
advanced economies difficult to enter 
economically, but obtaining the neces-
sary political co-operation would be very 
unlikely.40 
But subsidization can be used within a 
CU. For example, each government can 
provide a sufficient subsidy to firms 
otherwise unable to compete in order to 
enable these firms to sell in the CU mar-
ket at world-market prices. All intra-
union trade then takes place at world 
prices, the purchasing country suffers no 
loss, and the producing country bears the 
entire cost of its industry. In terms of 
national accounts, a system of subsidies 
is equivalent to compensation. But with 
subsidization, compensation is auto-
matic, and the prices of industrial goods 
within the CU remain equal to the prices 
of comparable imports. 
C O M P A R I S O N W I T H E X I S T I N G T H E O R Y 
It is of some interest to compare our 
results with those obtained by Viner and 
other CU theorists. In the Vinerian 
world, trade creation is good and trade 
diversion bad; a CU is more likely to re-
sult in a net welfare gain "the greater is 
the degree of overlapping between the 
class of commodities produced under 
40 Harry G. Johnson has suggested to us that 
general production subsidies could be used to evade 
the international rules against export subsidies. 
• 
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tariff protection in the two countries."41 
\Vith substantial overlapping, trade crea-
tion is likely to "outweigh" trade diver-
sion. If, however, the two countries are 
complementary, different industries are 
likely to be protected in each country, 
and a CD will tend on balance to be 
trade-diverting, with the loss in efficiency 
(and hence in welfare) that Vinerian 
theory associates with this result.-2 
Our model differs in two respects. 
First, we allow a possible preference for 
industry; second, we regard the tariff as a 
policy instrument rather than an exoge-
nous variable. The gains from a CU de-
pend on what happens to both income 
and industrial output; this, in turn, de-
41 R. G. Lipsey, "The Theory of Customs Un-
ions," op. tit., p. 499. Lipsey goes on to qualify these 
results by considering intercommodity substitution. 
He maintains that, given a sufficiently inappropriate 
set of revenue tariffs, prior to the formation of the 
CU, trade diversion can raise welfare. (See the two 
papers by Lipsey cited above.) For a critique of 
Lipsey's analysis, see our paper described in n. 4. 
42 Given that trade creation predominates, the 
magnitude of the gain will be greater (according to 
existing theory) the more complementary the two 
economies are—that is, the greater the difference in 
their costs of producing industrial goods. (See 
Lipsey, "The Theory of Customs Unions," op. til.-, 
H. Makower and G. Morton, " A Contribution 
towards a Theory of Customs Unions," Economic 
Journal, L X I I [March, 1953], 33-49; H. G. Johnson, 
Trade and Economic Growth [Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1962], p. 44.) But two 
situations must be distinguished. First, perhaps 
North has a substantial comparative advantage in 
industrial production generally, so that appreciable 
gains result from shifting production from South to 
North. In this case, the gains are simply a reflection 
of the highly uneconomic character of industrial 
production in South. But one is led to ask whether, 
in practice, South will be prepared to yield its pro-
tected industries to North. A quite different situa-
tion is one in which the industries on the lower half of 
{North's supply curve are quite different from the 
Industries on the lower half of South's curve. 
this is a peculiar set of circumstances. If 
wo countries produce identically the same batch of 
goods, one would be surprised to find grossly differ-
structures of costs in producing these goods. 
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pends on the common external tariff that 
is chosen. A CU involves the establish-
ment of conditions under which the 
tariff can be used more effectively. Our 
conclusions have been based on the as-
sumption that an appropriate tariff is 
always chosen. The emphasis is, in other 
words, on the potential gains. In Viner's 
world, the choice of tariff is sidestepped; 
it is often implied that a non-optimal 
tariff policy is adopted.43 
In our model, either trade creation or 
trade diversion can be good and either 
can be bad. With a trade-diversion case, 
each economy expands its industrial pro-
duction to supply the other's market. 
While this may reduce each economy's 
national income, industrial production is 
expanded. Without knowing more about 
the countries' indifference curves, one 
cannot say whether this raises or lowers 
welfare. Similarly, consider trade crea-
tion. Say that North is a lower-cost pro-
ducer than South for all industrial prod-
ucts, so that with a CU, production 
shifts from South to North. Although 
South now pays less for its industrial 
goods, its industrial sector has been lost 
in the bargain. Is South necessarily better 
off? Again, one cannot answer without 
some knowledge of South's preferences. 
If either country loses income or indus-
try, it must gain enough of the other to 
be adequately compensated. 
The potential gain from a CU will be 
larger if: (1) There is a steeply rising mar-
ginal cost of protection in the two coun-
tries, (2) the countries have a strong 
preference for industry, (3) the countries 
are complementary, and (4) neither 
country dominates the other in industrial 
43 To be fair to Viner we should point out that 
GATT rules constrain the member countries' ability 
to select an optimal tariff. Viner's analysis is, of 
course, based on an entirely different conception of 
tariff policy. 
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production generally.44 Even if the fourth 
condition does not obtain, gains can still, 
in principle, be obtained from forming a 
partial union or from some other device 
that interferes with free trade within the 
CU. The impact of a CU will depend on 
the precise rules under which it is formed 
—the rules governing the location of in-
dustry, intra-union trade, and compen-
sation. In general, the greater the flexibili-
ty of these rules, the larger are the po-
tential gains. 
But the real moral goes beyond these 
considerations. Economic integration 
may enable two or more economies to 
protect a given amount of industry at a 
lower real cost. Whether or not this re-
sult is effected depends on the prefer-
44 That is, neither country has an intra-union 
comparative advantage in all or most industries (the 
case shown in Fig. 3c). 
ences of the participants and, much more 
important, on the degree to which thev 
co-operate. In many cases detailed co-
operative effort will be needed if one 
country is not to lose more in the indus-
try dimension than it gains in the income 
dimension or, worse still, to lose in both 
dimensions. A CU may make it techni-
cally possible for both countries to gain; 
a CU combined with subsidization or 
comparable policies will guarantee a 
potential gain. But neither set of policies 
will insure that the gains are realized. 
In ideal cases there will be no conflict. 
By following their own bents, each coun-
try will gain. Even if no explicit compen-
sation is granted, gains may be roughly 
distributed to each. But in other cases 
not only will explicit compensation agree-
ments be required but there will have to 
be detailed agreement on intra-union 
division of industry. 
